ABSTRACT: Empirical examination of whether R&D subsidies crowd out private investments has been hampered by selection problems. A particular worry is that project quality and research intentions may be correlated with the likelihood of receiving subsidies. Using proposal evaluation data to control for research intentions, we do not find strong evidence suggesting that this type of selection creates a severe bias. Proposal evaluation grades strongly predict R&D investments and reduce selection bias in cross-sectional regressions, but there is limited variation in grades within firms over time. Hence, in our sample, unobserved project quality is largely absorbed by firm fixed effects. Our best estimate of the short-run additionality of R&D subsidies is 1.15, i.e., a one-unit increase in subsidy increases total R&D expenditure in the recipient firm by somewhat more than a unit. We demonstrate, however, that there is measurement error in the subsidy variable. Additionality is therefore likely to be underestimated. JEL CLASSIFICATION: O38, O32, L53, H25, H32
Introduction
The public good nature of innovation and R&D investments has attracted economists' attention for several decades and constitutes the principal justification for subsidies to commercial R&D. There is, however, little consensus in the literature with respect to the effects of such programs. Do subsidies to commercial R&D crowd out or stimulate private R&D investments? David, Hall and Toole (2000) survey 32 studies and conclude that "the findings overall are ambivalent". Garcia-Quevedo (2004) conducts a meta-analysis of 74 results from 39 studies, and concludes similarly that "the econometric evidence … is ambiguous". Finally, Bronzini and Iachini (2011) list eleven papers published during the last decade and find that only half of them confirm a positive role for public R&D incentives. Given the large amount of public resources devoted to R&D subsidies in all OECD economies, it is important to resolve this ambiguity.
One likely explanation for the lack of clear evidence is econometric problems related to selection, see David, Hall and Toole (2000) , Klette, Møen and Griliches (2000) , Jaffe (2002) and Cerulli (2010) for surveys. Wallsten (2000) explains the basic problem in one sentence: "Regressing some measure of innovation on the subsidy can establish a correlation between grants and R&D, but it cannot determine whether grants increase firm R&D or whether firms that do more R&D receive more grants." In order to identify the causal effect of R&D subsidies one must answer the following counter-factual question: What would subsidized firms have done if they did not receive subsidies?
Typically, subsidized firms are more R&D intensive than average firms, hence regressing R&D subsidies on private R&D investments will lead to a severe positive bias in the effect estimate. The standard remedy for this selection problem is to include a firm fixed effect or, equivalently, analyze the effect of a change in subsidies on the change in private R&D investments. This methodology was first introduced by Lichtenberg (1984) . Firm fixed effects will pick up aspects such as R&D experience, networks and experience with the application process and technological opportunities in the firm's product group. As pointed out by Klette et al. (2000) , however, there may be unobserved transitory effects that invalidates fixed effects estimation in this context. Firms are more likely to apply for subsidies when they have particularly good projects and a particularly good chance of receiving subsidies. At the same time, when firms have particularly good projects one would expect them to undertake more R&D than usual even without subsidies. Kauko (1996) discusses this endogeneity problem in a cross-sectional setting and asserts that "applications for financial support filed by a firm are certainly highly dependent on its intention to invest in R&D."
Finding instrumental variables that solve this endogeneity problem is very challenging, as demonstrated for example by the conflicting results of Lerner (1999) and Wallsten (2000) . Both analyze the effects of the SBIR-program in the US using an IV approach. Reflecting on these difficulties, Jaffe (2002) suggests that evaluation should be built into the design of public research support programs. More specifically, he notes that in a "canonical research programme" the agency that disburses money for research typically solicits evaluation reports from outside experts and then organizes a committee to rank or group the proposals in terms of priority for funding. The agency decides which proposals to fund, based on the available budget, the recommendations of the committee and possibly other criteria not related to proposal quality such as gender, geography and balancing of the grant portfolio e.g. by scientific field. Data generated by such a process can potentially solve the selection problem. To put it simply, Jaffe's idea is to compare projects right above and below the quality cut-off line used by the agency, and also to utilize the randomization of funding that criteria not related to project quality creates in the data. He suggests using an estimator based on the regression discontinuity design.
Typically, the proposal quality data envisaged by Jaffe is produced, but not recorded systematically and made available to researchers by grant awarding agencies. Although Jaffe's article is well cited, we are only aware of three studies that try to implement his estimation strategy; Jacob and Lefgren (2011) , Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2012) and Bronzini and Iachini (2011) . 1 The first two studies evaluate funding of academic research while Jaffe's main concern was the effectiveness of support to commercial R&D. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) analyze subsidies to commercial R&D, but lack data for the firms' R&D investments. Instead, they rely on balance sheet data and use investmentsintangible, tangible and total -as their preferred outcome variable.
In the current paper we explore the value of proposal quality data, gathered by the Research Council of Norway, in estimating the effect of support to industry-led R&D. The Research Council of Norway has for several years emphasized program evaluation, and proposal quality data is available in the PROVIS database established in 1999. We match the PROVIS evaluation data to the Norwegian Business Enterprise R&D statistics that are part of the joint OECD/Eurostat R&D survey, and we discuss different ways of using the available data to identify the causal effect of R&D subsidies on firms' R&D investments. The effect we attempt to identify is the average effect on firms, conditional on the existence and scale of the entire subsidy program of the Research Council and alternative public sources.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we discuss some practical limitations of the regression discontinuity design suggested by Jaffe (2002) . One concern is aggregation from proposal data to annual firm level R&D data when there are many proposals per firm and when the proposed projects last for several years. A more important limitation is that there are many different sub-programs with different and unclear thresholds for granting subsidies. This problem is related partly to the fact that there are several quality rankings for various aspects of a single proposal, and that it is not entirely clear which one is the most relevant.
Second, because of the difficulties in implementing the regression discontinuity design, we suggest an alternative approach and use the variables from the proposal evaluation database directly to proxy for project quality and research intentions. Proposal-quality grades have previously been used as a proxy variable in the literature on the effect of R&D support on scientific productivity, but to the best of our knowledge not in studies analyzing the effect of subsidies to commercial R&D. 2 A 1 A fourth relevant study is Serrano-Velarde (2008) using quantile regressions and regression discontinuity to estimate the impact of R&D subsidies on firm R&D investment under the French ANVAR program. Serrano-Velarde utilizes a discontinuity resulting from program specific eligibility requirements related to form of ownership, rather than proposal evaluation grades. We briefly summarize studies that use the regression discontinuity design in Henningsen, Haegeland and Møen (2012) , Appendix B. 2 Arora and Gambardella (2005) estimate the effect of grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the USA on impact weighted publications in a five-year window following the grant decision. One of their control variables is the average reviewer score of the proposal, ranging from 1 (excellent) to 5 (very poor). See also Chudnovsky, López, Rossi and Ubfal (2008) for a related analysis. particularly interesting variable in this respect is the evaluation panel's expectation of commercial benefit, i.e. the proposed project's contribution to firm profits. This variable can act as a proxy for a firm's incentive to invest in R&D, and therefore also for the intention to invest. When combining this commercial-benefits proxy with unobserved fixed effects, we find, somewhat to our surprise, that the bulk of variation in proposal grades is across firms rather than within firms. This suggests that including firm fixed effects largely solves the selection problem.
Third, comparing data on subsidies reported both by the firms and the granting agency, we document that there is measurement error in the subsidy variable. This will cause a negative bias in the additionality estimates, in particular in specifications that control for unobserved firm fixed effects (cf. Griliches and Hausman, 1986 ).
In the course of our analysis we present a series of estimates obtained under alternative assumptions and model specifications. Our preferred point estimates suggest that the short-run additionality of subsidies from the Research Council of Norway is positive and in the interval 1.0 to 1.3, i.e., a oneunit increase in the subsidy increases total R&D expenditure in the recipient firm by somewhat more than one unit. Using a log-log specification, we find that the elasticity of total R&D with respect to subsidies is about 0.20, suggesting that an increase in subsidies gives rise to a moderate increase in total R&D. Hence, there is no evidence that subsidies to commercial R&D crowd out private investments. In light of the many difficulties presented above, our results should be interpreted with caution. Given the extent of measurement errors that we document, however, we believe that our estimates are more likely to be too low than too high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses further the selection problem and the approach proposed by Jaffe (2002) . Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains our econometric analysis and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A provides an overview of the various dimensions of a research proposal that is assessed as part of the evaluation process in the Research Council of Norway.
Selection and proposal evaluation data as a potential remedy
The challenge of establishing the counterfactual in the case of governmental support for R&D comes from the fact that recipients of support typically are not a random sample of all possible recipients. Jaffe (2002) discusses this selection issue in detail and considers the following version of the standard model (p. 25 and 31): Regression discontinuity design (see, e.g., Imbens and Lemieux, 2008) , requires that the granting agency constructs one single variable that sums up the quality of the proposal, and that can be transformed into a unique value for each firm and year. The rate of acceptance should increase in the ranking, jump clearly at one threshold and not jump at other points. The ranking, if incomplete, should have a sufficient range and there must be a sufficient number of data points on either side of the threshold. Furthermore, the method requires that the relationship between the quality ranking and outcome is smooth around the threshold. The regression discontinuity design as proposed by Jaffe implies using a dummy variable for a ranking above the threshold as an instrument for D i , while conditioning on the quality ranking itself. This will identify the effect of receiving a grant on Y in a "small" region around the threshold.
The necessary data requirements, however, are not always fulfilled. As we will demonstrate below, the proposal quality data from the Research Council of Norway which we believe are typical for similar support programs in other countries, do not seem fully compatible with the regression discontinuity design. 4 For this reason we chose instead to use the quality ranking as a conditioning proxy variable and to control for unobserved firm-specific effects using a standard fixed effects estimator. However, while the regression discontinuity design only requires that we condition on what the granting agency knows, the proxy solution requires that the evaluation data capture all factors that affect both the probability of receiving a subsidy and the R&D investment decisions. It is not obvious that external experts can evaluate the private or social returns to commercial R&D projects with any precision, and this caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our core data source is the project databases PROVIS and FORISS of the Research Council of Norway. Matching these unique datasets to administrative registers and censuses for firms, such as the R&D survey and structural statistics of Statistics Norway, we get a data set that provides detailed information on firms and research support proposals.
Data sources and key variables
The PROVIS database contains information on every application to the 6 There are altogether 142 programs in our dataset. 50 percent of the firms have received support from more than one program, and 8 percent have received support from more than four programs. It should be noted, however, that the definition of a program, and in particular what constitutes a new program, is not fully consistent in our data. In some cases, we see a program existing for several years, awarding new grants each year. In other cases, programs award support for only one year, but a new program with a similar name is established the next year and so on. Most programs are relatively small in terms of number of applications and the amount awarded, even if we group together programs that we assume are similar. 7 The rules for how to calculate the co-financing were perceived to be rather lenient in the period we have data for. The correct number may therefore be closer to 50 %. of these do not conduct R&D. The PROVIS database includes 1480 firms and 4463 applications that have at least one year of proposed activity within the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . There are 631 firms that are represented both in the R&D surveys and in the PROVIS database. These firms have altogether 2444 applications for support, i.e. an average of almost four per firm. 49 % of the firms have only one application, 82 % have at most three, and 96 % have at most 10 applications. Within any given year, between 30 and 36 % of the firms that received subsidies from the Research Council of Norway, received subsidies for more than one project.
In the regression analysis that follows, we want to focus on R&D-performing firms. Hence, we exclude from our sample firms that are never observed with positive R&D.
8 Moreover, since we will estimate regressions with firm fixed effects, we also exclude firms that are observed only once. These firms will not contribute to identification. In Table 1B , we show the match between the remaining firms and the PROVIS database. Of 2570 R&D-performing firms with at least two observations in the R&D surveys, 446 firms have applied for R&D subsidies and are included in the PROVIS database. There are altogether 11368 firm-year observations of the 2570 firms in our regression sample. This implies that there are on average 4.4 observations per firm.
Aggregating proposal data to the firm level
The PROVIS and FORISS databases are organized with project proposals as the unit of observation, whereas the remaining data, and hence the analyses, are at the firm level. This makes it necessary to aggregate from the proposal level to the firm level. This aggregation concerns two sets of variables, proposal evaluations and the associated project subsidies. Aggregating subsidies is simple. We use the sum of subsidies paid out each year in all projects for each firm.
With respect to evaluations, we want to measure the quality of research ideas, where quality to the firm means the expected present discounted value of future profits generated by money invested in R&D now, and thus the strength of the incentive to invest in R&D. To achieve this we compute the average grade across all proposals for which the proposed period of activity spans the current year.
9
Proposals are evaluated along a number of dimensions, or aspects, resulting in a number of aspectspecific grades. In addition, an overall grade "Total evaluation" is given. The mean of grade j is named MGj. We focus on MG11, "Total evaluation", MG5, "Commercial benefit", and MG6, "Relevance and benefit to society". Almost 60 % of the aggregated firm-year level grades are based on only one project proposal. The average number of proposal level grades behind each aggregated firm-year level grade is 2.2. The maximum number of underlying grades is 33.
Subsidy measures
Our data sources contain two measures of R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. One measure is self-reported subsidies by the firms in the R&D survey (S R ). The other measure comes from the Research Council's FORISS database (S C ). The FORISS database includes information on realized projects for firms in the PROVIS database that had their proposals accepted. In principle, the two measures should correspond. Table 2 shows that the two measures do not correspond well, in the sense that one is often zero when the other is strictly positive. Of the 1132 observations with S C >0 or S R >0, both are positive in 449 cases. When both are positive, the coefficient of correlation is 0.70. 10 In a bivariate regression, and within the classical measurement error model, this would cause the OLS regression coefficient to be attenuated by 30 % if the two measures are of equal quality. We have checked that periodizing is not the main reason why the correspondence between the two subsidy measures is poor. Reporting of subsidies at different firm identification numbers is a possible explanation. This error could occur if subsidies are assigned to different firms within a business group in the R&D survey and in the proposal to the Research Council of Norway, or perhaps if firms change identification numbers over time, but that happens only in rare incidents. The most important source of error seems to be that the Research Council registers the entire subsidy on the lead firm in projects where two or more firms participate. For this reason we use self-reported subsidies by the firms in the R&D survey (S R ) as our main subsidy variable. This variable is also used extensively in previous academic research, but the fact that there are cases where this variable is zero while the Research Council reports positive subsidies shows that it is not perfect. This should not come as a surprise. Errors in self-reported subsidies may arise because the person filling in the questionnaire is not accurate enough in finding the exact numbers or in allocating received subsidies to the right governmental agency.
12
10 Under the assumptions of the classical errors-in-variables model and if the two measures are of equal quality, this correlation -known as the reliability ratio -measures the fraction of the variance in reported subsidies that is due to true variation in subsidies. See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) or Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) . 11 Some measurement errors could probably be avoided by pooling subsidies from different sources, but then we could not estimate the degree of additionality associated with each specific source. The degree of additionality is likely to vary between sources, e.g. because some public financing is given as matching grants subsidies and some as contract R&D. 12 See Finne (2011) for an assessment of the accuracy of the Norwegian R&D survey.
In addition to subsidies from the Research Council of Norway, firms can receive R&D subsidies from EU bodies (S EU ) and from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and some other public sources. Innovation Norway is a government agency for the promotion of nationwide industrial development. In the R&D surveys subsidies from ministries, Innovation Norway and others are combined in one variable (S G ). It is important to account for subsidies from sources other than the Research Council of Norway, because subsidies may be correlated. Omitting subsidies from alternative sources will then lead to bias in the estimated additionality associated with the subsidies from the Research Council.
The presence of measurement error in the subsidy variables implies that our estimates of additionality will be biased towards zero. However, under certain assumptions we may exploit the fact that we have two subsidy measures to obtain better estimates of the true additionality by using an instrumental variables model. We return to this in section 4.5. 
Proposal evaluations and R&D investments
The project proposals are evaluated on 11 aspects. Five of these are evaluated by external scientific experts, the remainder by the Research Council of Norway. Aspect 11, 'Total evaluation', is evaluated by the Research Council of Norway taking into consideration the external experts' evaluations. See Table A1 in the appendix for the aspects and a short summary of the assessment criteria. All aspects except 'Risk' and 'Other conditions' are evaluated on a scale from 1 to 7 with 7 being the top grade. When deciding on the subsidies, the program board in charge may decide to grant subsidies to many or few of the applicants, they may subsidize only parts of a given project proposal, or for a shorter period than was applied for. This varies across programs, and may be endogenous to the number and quality of proposals. In most cases, however, the granted subsidy is close to the amount applied for if the proposal receives a subsidy.
Subsidies are only available at certain points in time, and the timing of announcements, proposal deadlines, program duration and amount of subsidies available can be regarded as exogenous from the firm's point of view. This introduces random variation in received subsidies, and thus alleviates to some extent the problem of endogeneity of contemporaneous subsidies in regressions that explain intramural R&D.
13 Table 4 shows the number of proposals and the acceptance rate by grades of Aspect 11, 'Total evaluation' and Aspect 5, 'Commercial benefits', before aggregation to the firm level. Grades are concentrated in the range 3-6, and it is difficult to identify one jump point. Without a clear threshold, and observing that there are de facto only four grade levels assigned, it is difficult to apply the approach advocated by Jaffe (2002) to these data. However, the original endogeneity problem arises from an omitted variable. The omitted variable is the potential returns to R&D investments to the firm, and the evaluation data may provide good proxies for this variable.
In the following, we focus on Aspect 5, 'Commercial benefits'. This variable measures the evaluation panel's expectation of the contribution to profits from the proposed project. It should therefore be a useful proxy for the quality of current project ideas in the firm that also affects the decision to invest in R&D. Table 4 shows that the acceptance rate increases with MG5, but of course less strongly than with MG11, because Aspect 5 is only one of several aspects behind Aspect 11. Table 5 shows how R&D investment, sales and the incidence of subsidies vary by whether the firm has applied for support from the Research Council of Norway, and by the average evaluation of Aspect 5, 'Commercial benefits', for proposals if it did apply. Firms that did not apply are smaller in terms of sales, are less likely to invest in R&D, and invest far less than applicants if they do invest. Among applicants, there is also a clear positive relationship between grade and R&D investment as we would expect: When firms have particularly good research ideas, they invest more in developing them. However, some of this positive correlation may be because of size, as grades tend to increase with average sales. The relationship between grade and whether or not the applicant invests is less strong for average grades above 3, suggesting that when project quality exceeds a certain level, the decision to invest or not is mainly governed by factors less closely related to proposal quality, i.e., grades seem to matter more for the intensive margin than for the extensive margin. Finally, grades aggregated to the firm level are related closely to whether or not the Research Council of Norway grants support. This is as expected although one may question why projects with a top grade on commercial benefit should receive public support. Even in these cases, however, public support is warranted if the technological risk is high or the firms are liquidity constrained. The fixed effects analyses rely on variation in grades over time within firms. Using only firm-year observations where the firm has applied for support and where MG5 is non-missing, 122 firms have at least two different values of this variable in two different years, and account for 729 valid observations, of which 559 have non-zero MG5. Among the 559 observations, the variance of MG5 cleansed of within-firm means is 0.24, ranging from -1.5 to 2. It is essentially this variation we use to control for the time varying incentive to invest in R&D when we account for firm fixed effects.
Because the fixed effects approach with grades as proxies for research intentions relies on a limited number of firms and limited variation in grades, we will also use a dynamic model where firm fixed effects are replaced by a lagged dependent variable. Table 6 gives summary statistics for key variables. Sales are measured in NOK million, R&D investment and subsidies are measured in NOK 1000, all deflated by the consumer price index to base year 2000. (One million NOK is about 125 000 euros or 150 000 US dollars). We note that the distributions of sales and intramural R&D are highly skewed, with the means exceeding the medians by a factor of 8 and 4.5, respectively. 
Summary statistics

Econometric analysis
In the following, we apply two alternative approaches that utilize the available proposal evaluation data to try to estimate the causal effect of subsidies from the Research Council of Norway on intramural R&D in private firms.
Baseline model
To focus our discussion, we begin with a specification similar to equation (1), but with a continuous rather than a dichotomous subsidy variable.
The dependent variable, Y it , is intramural R&D of firm i in year t, and S it is the amount of R&D subsidies received from the Research Council of Norway by firm i in year t. Of the two measures we have of this variable, we chose to use the one that is self-reported by the firms (S R ) as this matches the intramural R&D variable and the other subsidy variables in the sense that they all come out of the R&D surveys conducted by Statistics Norway. Moreover, the subsidy variable provided by the Research Council (S C ) has probably larger measurement error because the Research Council registers the entire subsidy on the lead firm in projects where two or more firms participate.
Other observed variables that affect R&D are contained in X it . These are sales, subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies (S G ), and subsidies from EU
bodies (S EU
. Obviously, all R&D subsidies are subject to the same selection issues as subsidies from the Research Council. EU-grants demand very high standards, while subsidies from Innovation Norway may be less competitive than subsidies from the Research Council. The parameter of main interest is , which measures the average effect of subsidies on intramural R&D from the Research Council. If  exceeds unity, there is positive additionality, i.e., one extra unit of subsidy causes firms to invest more than one extra unit in R&D. If  is smaller than one, subsidies partly crowd out private capital, i.e. firms use the subsidy to finance some of the R&D activity that would also have been carried out without the subsidy. A zero coefficient implies full crowding out.
Recall that summary statistics showed substantial variation in sales and intramural R&D within the sample. This translates into a heteroskedasticity problem. It is common that R&D subsidy programs include firms that vary considerably in scale, but the previous literature is remarkably silent as to whether and how this is handled.
14 In order to reduce heteroskedasticity associated with differences in firm size, we weight the data using a simple method suggested by Park (1966) . The weights are determined by first estimating equation (2) without weights and obtaining the coefficient on log sales in a regression of the log of the squared residuals on log sales. Dividing through in equation (2) by sales to the power of this coefficient/2 gives errors that are approximately homoskedastic.
15 Table 7 , columns (1) and (2), show the results of estimating equation (2) in levels with and without firm fixed effects. A matching grants subsidy regime implies a linear relationship between R&D investments and subsidies. We follow e.g. Wallsten (2000) and Lach (2002) and use this as our main functional form. The specification without fixed effects includes industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level. In column (1) Park's (1966) procedure implies dividing the equation through by sales to the power of 0.16. In the fixed effects regression in column (2), Park's weight is sales to the power of 0.20.
In Table 7 , column (1), where we do not control for firm fixed effects, we get additionality estimates that are implausibly high. The coefficient associated with subsidies from the Research Council is 4.32. When we control for firm fixed effects, in column (2), the coefficient is reduced to 1.37. The fixed effects estimate implies that when firms receive one unit more in subsidies than they usually do, they do 1.37 units more R&D. Most likely the high pooled OLS estimate reflects that firms that do more R&D receive more subsidies, i.e. a reversed causality problem. We may also note that the additionality associated with EU grants is very high, 2.77. This is perhaps still implausibly high -but not very precisely estimated. 16 The additionality associated with grants from ministries, Innovation
Norway and other public agencies, 0.33, is very low. This is plausible as this includes contract R&D which is not primarily given with the aim to stimulate the firms' own R&D investments.
As an alternative to the linear specification, we apply a log-log model. 17 The survey by David et al. (2000) shows that log-log is also a fairly common functional form in previous studies. Taking logs has the benefit of reducing problems with outliers and heteroskedasticity such that weighting has little 14 An exception is Lerner (1999) who explicitly notes that the firms were of very different sizes and that a heteroskedasticity problem potentially existed. Because of this, he divides the firms into groups on the basis of sales and calculated heteroskedastic-consistent standard error. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) scale all variables with sales. 15 Formal tests show that this procedure works very well compared both to no weighting and to scaling all variables with sales. We combine Park's procedure with estimating heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, hence eliminating all heteroskedasticity is not imperative 16 Firm fixed effects will hopefully absorb most of the unobserved effects associated with all grants, but it is possible that in particular EU subsidies, being highly competitive, are associated with unobserved time-varying changes in research quality and intentions that we are not able to control for, cf. Table 8 . Hence, the coefficients on EU subsidies should be interpreted with caution. 17 The large number of zeros in intramural R&D and subsidies presents a specification problem. We use the approximation that ln(z)=0 if z=0, where z is a variable measured in 1000 real NOK. effect on the estimates. However, this specification alters the interpretation of the relationship between the variables as the coefficient on log subsidy is an elasticity. Columns (3) and (4) show estimates of equation (2) in log-log form with and without fixed effects. The estimated elasticities on subsidies from the Research Council are 0.42 using OLS and 0.22 when introducing firm fixed effects. We see again that the fixed effects estimate is substantially smaller than the pooled OLS estimates, consistent with the former being spuriously high because of omitted firm specific effects. The fixed effect estimate implies that a 1 % increase in the subsidy raises intramural R&D by 0.22 %. For a firm with initial intramural R&D and subsidy equal to the means presented in Table 6 , the effect of a marginal increase in the subsidy of 1 % is about NOK 14600, and the implied increase in intramural R&D is about NOK 21900. 18 Hence, a one-unit increase in the subsidy increases intramural R&D by about 1.5 units. This estimate at the mean is quite close to the fixed effects levels estimate of 1.4 in column (2).
We have done a series of robustness tests on Table 7 . First, with respect to correction for heteroskedasticity, we find that the estimated additionality is sensitive to the choice of weights. In Table 7 , column (2), the additionality estimate of 1.37 increases to 2.27 if no weights are applied, and it is reduced to 0.94 if we divide through in equation (2) with the square root of sales instead of the optimal Park's weights as explained above. In light of this, it is interesting that correction for heteroskedasticity has received little attention in the previous literature. Second, with respect to sample criteria, the additionality estimate of 1.37 in Table 7 , column (2), is reduced to 0.94 if observations with zero R&D are removed, and it is 1.14 if only firms that have applied for subsidies in the year of the observation are included. Finally, if we remove all observations with zero subsidies, we are not able to estimate positive additionality at all from the levels regression, and with the loglog specification in column (4), the additionality estimate is reduced from 0.22 to 0.11, significant at the 5 %-level. Hence, the results depend critically on including firms that do not receive subsidies as a control group. 
Accounting for R&D intentions: A proxy variable approach
A major concern when interpreting additionality estimates obtained from the models presented above, is that subsidies may be endogenous because of correlation with contemporaneous errors, even after eliminating firm fixed effects. We discussed this in Section 1, and in Section 2 it was formalized by having two time-varying error components  it and  it in equation (1). The first component,  it , represents the quality of current research ideas, or the intention to carry out R&D in the absence of subsidies. This intention may be correlated with the likelihood of applying for and receiving subsidies.
We propose to account for  it by a proxy variable solution, using the mean grade for Aspect 5, 'Commercial benefits' (MG5 it ). Recall that MG5 it is the average of grade 5 over all proposals that potentially spanned the current year for the given firm, as described in the data section. Aspect 5 is meant to measure the net financial gains from completing the project, although it is unclear whether or not this involves conditioning on taking the product to the market, or reaching some other threshold of success (see Appendix A). The proxy solution requires that MG5 it is redundant in (2) with u it = it + it once  it is controlled for, and that (X it , S it ,  t ) are uncorrelated with  it , conditional on MG5 it . 20 Because MG5 it is missing in some cases, we also include a dummy variable MG5MISS it that equals one if the firm applied this year and MG5 is missing. Note that 'applied this year' refers to years spanned by the projects applied for, not the years when proposals were submitted. In addition, a dummy REJECT it for 'applied and all proposals rejected' is included, because those who applied have demonstrated that they have an intention to carry out R&D (although perhaps not in the case of rejection). 21 Hence, the reference category is 'did not apply for funding this year'. The estimated equation then becomes
19 This is probably the case for most additionality analyses, and is obviously the only source of identification for the many studies that rely on a dummy for whether firms receive subsidies or not. 20 This is when the model is estimated with firm fixed effects. For pooled OLS, the firm fixed effects α i also needs to be uncorrelated with  it conditional on the proxy. 21 Kauko (1996) suggests that controlling for applications filed will solve the endogeneity problem. This, however, is only true to the extent that the firms' own evaluation of the R&D projects is not affected by the outcome of the application. EU bodies. S G is R&D subsidies from Norwegian ministries, Innovation Norway and other public agencies. MG5 is the evaluation grade on Aspect 5, 'Commercial benefits'. MG11 is the evaluation grade on Aspect 11, 'Total evaluation'. REJECT implies that the firm applied for subsidies, but had the application rejected by the Research Council. All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two-digit NACE groups. We correct for heteroskedasticity using Park's (1966) procedure. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firms are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table 8 shows results of estimating the levels model based on equation (3). We find the pooled OLS results in column (1). The coefficient for MG5 is positive and highly significant. A one-unit increase in the commercial-benefits-grade is associated with an increase in intramural R&D of NOK 2.3 million, which is about 24 % for a firm with average R&D. The coefficient for MG5 it missing is marginally significant, and corresponds to an average grade around 1.6. 22 This is very low. The rejection dummy is negative, suggesting that rejected applicants tend to invest less in R&D than other firms, including non-applicants. This is reasonable as they receive a signal that they have low-quality proposals. The additionality estimate associated with subsidies from the Research Council, is 2.75. This is suspiciously high, but much lower than the corresponding estimate in Table 7 . Hence, using the grade for commercial benefit as a proxy for unobserved R&D intentions does seem to reduce the omitted variable bias in pooled OLS. Note also that the proxy does not have any effect on the other two subsidy variables as these estimates are very similar to the ones in Table 7 .
When including firm fixed effects in column (2), the explanatory power of the proposal data vanishes. This shows that it is the cross-sectional variation that drives the significance in the model without fixed effects. At 1.28, the additionality point estimate is also quite close to the fixed effects estimate without using evaluation data, which was 1.37. Because Aspect 5 may not pick up all relevant information about the firms' R&D intentions, we include in column (3) the mean of grades for Aspect 11, 'Total evaluation'. However, this grade does not seem to add any information about R&D investment, although MG5 now becomes marginally significant. Experimenting with other grades leads to the same conclusion.
Many firms never apply for R&D subsidies, and these are on average small firms with little R&D investments. In Column (4) we limit the sample to firms that applied for subsidies at least once during the data period, in case these have different parameters. Despite the much smaller sample size, the additionality estimate is fairly stable. It increases to 1.46, and naturally loses precision. The grade variables are still insignificant. Finally, in column (5), we restrict the sample further, and only use firms that have applied more than once and have variation in the MG5-variable. These are the firms that contribute directly to identifying the grade coefficient. In this sample of 122 firms the coefficient on MG5 it is negative and still insignificant. We also note a drop in estimated additionality. The coefficient is 1.13 and insignificant.
In Table 9 , we report the same analyses as in Table 8 for the log-log specification. Introducing the proxy for R&D intensions in pooled OLS reduces the estimated elasticity of intramural R&D with respect to Research Council subsidies from 0.42 to 0.31. This suggests again that evaluation data do reduce endogeneity in cross-sectional regressions. The coefficients on MG5 it and MG5MISS it are positive and significant. A one-unit increase in the grade is associated with a 29 % increase in intramural R&D. This is a substantial effect and consistent with the idea that firms with high quality projects will invest more in R&D than others even without subsidies. We may also note that the size of the estimate is similar to what we found in the levels form regression for a firm with average R&D investments. REJECT it is positive and insignificant in this specification. The results in column (2) confirm the level analysis in Table 8 . The fixed effects additionality estimates are virtually unaffected by the proxy variable approach, and all the grade variables are insignificant. Dropping firms that never applied to the Research Council has little impact on the estimates, while using only the few firms with variation in MG5 reduces the estimated subsidy elasticity to half. The coefficient of MG5 it remains insignificant and close to zero.
We conclude that with the available data and within a fixed effects framework, there is little to gain from adding grades from proposal evaluations.
We have performed the same robustness checks on the regressions in Table 8 as those reported  after Table 7 , and with similar results. In addition, we have explored whether additionality vary between different programs, cf. footnote 6. Running program specific regressions on firms that have applied for subsidies from the largest programs do produce some variability in the estimated additionality coefficients, but it is difficult to find significant patterns. Comparing the largest half of programs with the smallest half, the additionality estimates in the two samples are very similar. 
Accounting for R&D intentions: Using a lagged dependent variable
The models presented above ignore potential adjustment costs and that projects often span two or more calendar years. Adjustment costs imply that past R&D investment affect current investment conditional on current values of the control variables. 23 The problem can be handled by including lagged R&D investments as a regressor, and 12 out of 39 studies used in the meta-analysis by GarciaQuevedo (2004) use a specification of this type.
As pointed out by Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 5.3) , it can be challenging to separate fixed effects and lagged dependent variables in applied work. They recommend trying out both specifications to check robustness. The interpretation of the coefficients on the subsidy differs, however, in an important way. With adjustment costs (represented by a lagged dependent variable), the long-run effect of increasing the subsidy exceeds the short-run effect; whereas if the persistence in R&D is attributed to a fixed effect, the impact of increasing the subsidy for one period only lasts one period.
It is plausible that there are both fixed effects and adjustment costs in R&D investments. With fixed effects, however, the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous, and the best empirical approach would be to use the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator to account for the lagged dependent variable and eliminate the fixed effects. Because this technique makes use of at least two lags of the data, and the within-firm variation in key variables is limited in our data set, we are forced to leave out fixed effects when including lagged intramural R&D. Lagged intramural R&D will account for part of the fixed effects and allows us to exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data, in particular in the proposal evaluations. Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that if a model erroneously is estimated with fixed effects instead of a lagged dependent variable, the estimated 'treatment effect' of an intervention will be overestimated. However, if the model is estimated using a lagged dependent variable when one should have used a fixed effect, the treatment effect is underestimated. Hence, estimates from a model with a lagged dependent variable and a model with fixed effects may under certain assumptions be seen as the lower and upper bounds of the true treatment effects. In this respect, a dynamic specification complements our fixed effects analysis.
We estimate the following model, where we apply the proxy variable approach combined with lagged R&D as a right-hand side variable:
We also estimate a corresponding model for the log-log form. The long run effect of a marginal increase in the subsidy is in this case /(1-). Table 10 displays the results from estimating equation (4) in levels and logs. Beginning with the levels regression in columns (1) and (2), lagged intramural R&D has a large coefficient which means that adjustment costs and persistence in R&D investment are large. However, the omitted fixed effects probably inflate the estimate. For the other variables, we see that the results are quite similar to the fixed effects estimates in Table 8 . The estimated additionality is 1.03 in column (1) and 1.56 in column (2). The small subsample of firms with variation in MG5 it now gives the largest additionality estimate, while in Table 8 this sample produced the smallest estimate. This instability may simply be due to the small sample size and low precision.
The implied long run effects are very large, 6.5 and 5.9, respectively. Given that we most likely have an omitted fixed effect that is correlated with the included lagged dependent variable, however, we should not put too much emphasis on the long-run effects.
Following the reasoning of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and combining the estimated contemporaneous effect, 2  , from column (1) in this model and the corresponding fixed effects estimates in Table 8 , column (2), suggests that the true short-run additionality effect is within the interval 1.030 to 1.275 with a mid-point of 1.15. With the log-log specification, the estimates in Table 10 , columns (3) and (4), also reveal considerable persistence in R&D investments. The contemporaneous elasticities are fairly close to the fixed effects estimates. For all firms, the interval suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009) is 0.17 to 0.22. The estimated long-run elasticities range from 0.19 to 0.37. Interestingly, MG5 is significant in column (1) and (3), but the significance disappears when the sample is restricted to firms that have variation in MG5. This suggests that the effect of MG5 in columns (1) and (3) is driven by between-firm variation.
Measurement error bias
In Section 3.3, we demonstrated that the subsidy measures contain measurement error. When both the available measures are positive, the correlation between them is only 0.70.
Because we have two measures of the same subsidy, S R and S C , we may use one as an instrument for the other to reduce measurement error bias, provided that they are only correlated through the true subsidy (see, e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994 or Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001) . Because the two observed measures tend to coincide on the value zero (we have many more observations with a zero subsidy than with a positive subsidy), the two measurement errors are correlated. 24 However, this is unconditional on the included variables. By accounting for whether or not the firm has applied for support in a given year through the grade variables and for rejection, we eliminate some of this correlation. We apply the IV solution, using S C as an instrument for S R , to both the levels and log-log forms, with and without fixed effects, see Tables 11 and 12 . For comparison we include the results from the corresponding regressions in Tables 8 and 9 where we did not attempt to correct for measurement errors. .069 The dependent variable is intramural R&D. All specifications include year dummies. Pooled OLS also includes dummies for two digit NACE groups. Weighted using Park's optimal weight. Standard errors allowing for clustering of residuals by firm are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0
Using the levels form, we see that the additionality estimates increase by a factor of about four when using pooled OLS, and by a factor of about two when using fixed effects. The direction is as expected, but the magnitude is too large to be plausible, and suggests that there are unresolved biases. Using the log-log specification, we get about a 30 % increase in the coefficient when using IV on the specification without fixed effects, but in the fixed effects specification the coefficient becomes small and insignificant when using IV. We have no explanation for this, but given the large standard error of the coefficient, it might be coincidental.
In general, we must conclude that our attempt to use IV estimation to correct for measurement 24 Another situation that will take us outside the classical measurement error model is if total subsidies are measured correctly, but distributed erroneously on the three subsidy variables included in our regression.
errors has limited success. Most likely, this is because the assumptions behind the classical errors-invariables model are not fulfilled. We have experimented with several alternative specifications and subsamples without obtaining any robust findings. Despite this, something has still been learned from the two measures of subsidies, as we have demonstrated that there are measurement errors in the data. It is hard to assess to what extent this finding can be generalized to data sets from other countries, but Norwegian data is usually perceived to be of high quality. This suggests that additionality estimates that do not correct for measurement errors may have a substantial negative bias. 
Conclusion
Empirical examination of whether R&D subsidies to private firms crowd out private investments has been hampered by problems related to selection bias. In particular, subsidies may be endogenous even after eliminating firm fixed effects because the quality of current research ideas may be correlated with the likelihood of applying for and receiving subsidies. Access to proposal evaluation data has been suggested as a potential remedy. Using such data we do not find strong evidence suggesting that this type of selection creates a severe bias. Proposal evaluation grades from the Research Council of Norway strongly predict R&D investments in cross-sectional regressions, with a one-unit increase in grade being associated with an increase in intramural R&D between 20 and 30 %. There is, however, limited variation in the proposal evaluation grades within firms over time. Evaluation grades are by no means a perfect measure of project quality, but in our data unobserved project quality seems to be largely absorbed by firm fixed effects at least when it comes to subsidies from the Research Council of Norway. The extent to which this holds true for other programs will depend on the context. Our findings, however, suggest that selection bias due to unobserved project quality may not be a major issue when panel data are available.
Our best estimate of the short-run additionality of R&D subsidies from the Research Council of Norway is 1.15, i.e., a one-unit increase in the subsidy increases total R&D expenditure in the recipient firm by somewhat more than one unit. This is slightly higher than the fixed effects estimate in Klette and Møen (2012) using similar Norwegian data from the years 1982-1995. The point estimates we obtain are somewhat sensitive to specification choices, but there are very few estimates below one. Using log-log specifications our best estimate for the elasticity of R&D with respect to subsidies is about 0.20.
However, we have demonstrated that there is measurement error in the subsidy variable. Additionality is therefore likely to be underestimated.
